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The generalized Nash equilibrium model for oligopolistic transit market with elastic demand

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  • Zhou, Jing
  • Lam, William H.K.
  • Heydecker, Benjamin G.

Abstract

This paper presents a bilevel transit fare equilibrium model for a deregulated transit system. In the upper-level problem, the transit competition is portrayed as an n-player, non-cooperative game by changing the fare structure of each of a set of transit lines separately so as to maximize the profit of each transit operator within the oligopolistic market. We show that there exists a generalized Nash game between transit operators, which can be formulated as a quasi-variational inequality problem. In the lower-level problem, the passengers' response to the equilibrium fare structure of the transit operators is represented by the stochastic user equilibrium transit assignment model with elastic OD demand. As a result, the bilevel transit fare equilibrium problem is presented in the Stackelberg form and solved by a heuristic solution algorithm based on a sensitivity analysis approach. A numerical example is given to illustrate the competition mechanism on the transit network and some useful findings are presented on competitive operations.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhou, Jing & Lam, William H.K. & Heydecker, Benjamin G., 2005. "The generalized Nash equilibrium model for oligopolistic transit market with elastic demand," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 519-544, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:transb:v:39:y:2005:i:6:p:519-544
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    References listed on IDEAS

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