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Pricing of track time in railroad operations: An internal market approach

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  • Harker, Patrick T.
  • Hong, Sungwook

Abstract

This paper presents a computable equilibrium model of an internal market for track resources in a railroad. The problem of estimating the value to each train of track capacity, which in turn is used to create the actual train schedules, is formulated as an N-player, noncooperative game with nondisjoint strategy sets. In this model, the effects of other traffic on a given train schedule (the mean and variance of total travel time) are represented by a line delay model for a scheduled railroad on a partially double track rail line. The generalized Nash equilibrium for the resulting game-theoretic model is found as a solution to a quasi-variational inequality problem. The goal of this model is to ascertain how close the prices from the internal market system (the game-theoretic model) comes to globally optimal prices. Data from a major Class I railroad are used to explore this issue in detail.

Suggested Citation

  • Harker, Patrick T. & Hong, Sungwook, 1994. "Pricing of track time in railroad operations: An internal market approach," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 197-212, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:transb:v:28:y:1994:i:3:p:197-212
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    Cited by:

    1. Cardell, Judith B. & Hitt, Carrie Cullen & Hogan, William W., 1997. "Market power and strategic interaction in electricity networks," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 109-137, March.
    2. Talebian, Ahmadreza & Zou, Bo & Peivandi, Ahmad, 2018. "Capacity allocation in vertically integrated rail systems: A bargaining approach," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 167-191.
    3. Kraay, David R. & Harker, Patrick T., 1995. "Real-time scheduling of freight railroads," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 213-229, June.
    4. Li, Dongjun & Islam, Dewan Md Zahurul & Robinson, Mark & Song, Dong-Ping & Dong, Jing-Xin & Reimann, Marc, 2024. "Network revenue management game in the railway industry: Stackelberg equilibrium, global optimality, and mechanism design," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 312(1), pages 240-254.
    5. Francisco Facchinei & Christian Kanzow, 2010. "Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 177-211, March.
    6. Alberto Caprara & Matteo Fischetti & Paolo Toth, 2002. "Modeling and Solving the Train Timetabling Problem," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 50(5), pages 851-861, October.

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