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Free speech and the challenge of efficiency

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  • Hazlett, Thomas W.

Abstract

Radical transformation has come to speech platforms in the Information Society 2.0, typified by the migration from newspapers to social media. The change has been spurred by disruptive efficiencies in digital platforms. First, information distribution has been altered by near-costless electronic reproduction. Second, traditional bundles -- packaging editorial content of publications or broadcast networks with general-interest advertising messages -- have been eclipsed by competitively superior news aggregation hubs. Third, specialized content, including advertising, has become more easily targeted and better supplied via “long tails.” Fourth, the democratization of “publishing” has transformed “editing” into “platform mediation.” The resulting changes in market organization have made vastly higher volumes of news and public affairs information – from exponentially more sources – easily available to mass market consumers. In so doing, they have rendered the “Walter Cronkite” consensus obsolete, creating social controversy and considerable backlash. Demands to regulate, or re-regulate, are frequently voiced across the political spectrum. Such policies as “public interest” licensing, public utility regulation, and the Fairness Doctrine are here evaluated.

Suggested Citation

  • Hazlett, Thomas W., 2022. "Free speech and the challenge of efficiency," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 46(9).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:46:y:2022:i:9:s0308596122001112
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2022.102409
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Howell, Bronwyn E. & Potgieter, Petrus H., 2023. "What do telecommunications policy academics have to fear from GPT-3?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(7).

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