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A comprehensive secondary market model for virtualized wireless connectivity

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  • Gomez, Marcela M.
  • Weiss, Martin B.H.

Abstract

Secondary markets are essential if we are to re-assign valuable resources such as radio spectrum to users and services who value them most. Despite the potential that markets have to perform this task, it is still difficult to find real-world examples of successful secondary markets for spectrum. In this work, we explore a broader context where markets would be deployed to shed light on the different components that may affect their viability.

Suggested Citation

  • Gomez, Marcela M. & Weiss, Martin B.H., 2020. "A comprehensive secondary market model for virtualized wireless connectivity," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(10).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:44:y:2020:i:10:s0308596120301130
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2020.102021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(1), pages 79-112.
    2. Elinor Ostrom, 2010. "Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(3), pages 641-672, June.
    3. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005. "A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 376-380, May.
    4. Alvin Roth, 2008. "Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 537-569, March.
    5. Matheson, Robert & Morris, Adele C., 2012. "The technical basis for spectrum rights: Policies to enhance market efficiency," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(9), pages 783-792.
    6. Bustamante, Pedro & Gomez, Marcela & Murtazashvili, Ilia & Weiss, Martin, 2020. "Spectrum anarchy: why self-governance of the radio spectrum works better than we think," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(6), pages 863-882, December.
    7. Marilda Sotomayor, 1992. "The Multiple Partners Game," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Mukul Majumdar (ed.), Equilibrium and Dynamics, chapter 17, pages 322-354, Palgrave Macmillan.
    8. Arnon Tonmukayakul & Martin Weiss, 2008. "A study of secondary spectrum use using agent-based computational economics," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 125-151, October.
    9. Roth, Alvin E., 2012. "The Theory and Practice of Market Design," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2012-5, Nobel Prize Committee.
    10. Song, Hee Seok & Kim, Taewan & Kim, Taehan, 2017. "The impact of spectrum policies on the secondary spectrum market: A system dynamics approach," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 460-472.
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