IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/telpol/v36y2012i7p522-530.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reception-oriented radio rights: Increasing the value of wireless by explicitly defining and delegating radio operating rights

Author

Listed:
  • de Vries, J. Pierre
  • Sieh, Kaleb A.

Abstract

The increasingly intensive coexistence of diverse radio systems and the inability of existing institutions to resolve conflicts in a timely manner require a change in the way operating rights are defined, assigned, and enforced. This paper proposes a regulatory approach that increases delegation to operators and reduces ambiguity by (1) more clearly defining operating rights and harmful interference using the Three P approach of probabilistic reception protections and transmission permissions; (2) facilitating transactions by limiting the number of parties to a negotiation, only altering the rights in a license at renewal, and implementing a registry; and (3) making rights enforcement more efficient by enabling direct enforcement of rights, separating rulemaking from adjudication, and defining remedies up-front.

Suggested Citation

  • de Vries, J. Pierre & Sieh, Kaleb A., 2012. "Reception-oriented radio rights: Increasing the value of wireless by explicitly defining and delegating radio operating rights," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 522-530.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:36:y:2012:i:7:p:522-530
    DOI: 10.1016/j.telpol.2011.12.009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308596111002291
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.telpol.2011.12.009?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lawrence White, 2000. ""Propertyzing" the Electromagnetic Spectrum: Why It's Important, and How to Begin," Working Papers 00-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    2. Polinsky, A Mitchell, 1980. "On the Choice between Property Rules and Liability Rules," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 18(2), pages 233-246, April.
    3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 2, number 2.
    4. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    5. Hazlett, Thomas W, 1990. "The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 133-175, April.
    6. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), 2007. "Handbook of Law and Economics," Handbook of Law and Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    7. Lueck, Dean & Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Property Law," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 3, pages 183-257, Elsevier.
      • Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Property Law," Working papers 2004-04, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    8. Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, 1992. "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(3), pages 249-262.
    9. Shelanski, Howard A & Huber, Peter W, 1998. "Administrative Creation of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 581-607, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. El-Moghazi, Mohamed & Whalley, Jason & Irvine, James, 2017. "The Future of International Radio Regulations: Transformation Towards Sharing," 28th European Regional ITS Conference, Passau 2017 169457, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    2. El-Moghazi, Mohamed & Whalley, Jason & Irvine, James, 2014. "International spectrum management regime: Is gridlock blocking flexible spectrum property rights?," 20th ITS Biennial Conference, Rio de Janeiro 2014: The Net and the Internet - Emerging Markets and Policies 106866, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    3. El-Moghazi, Mohamed & Whalley, Jason & Irvine, James, 2016. "Wireless access policy for electronic communications services (WAPECS): Collision between theory and practice," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(8), pages 821-835.
    4. de Vries, J. Pierre, 2013. "Optimizing receiver performance using harm claim thresholds," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(9), pages 757-771.
    5. El-Moghazi, Mohamed & Whalley, Jason & Irvine, James, 2014. "Wireless Access Policy for Electronic Communications Services (WAPECS): Collision between theory and practice," 25th European Regional ITS Conference, Brussels 2014 101380, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jongwook Kim & Joseph T. Mahoney, 2002. "Resource-based and property rights perspectives on value creation: the case of oil field unitization," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(4-5), pages 225-245.
    2. Benito Arruñada, 2012. "Property as an economic concept: reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 121-144, July.
    3. Thomas J. Miceli, 2011. "The Use of Economics for Understanding Law: An Economist's View of the Cathedral," Working papers 2011-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    4. Dieter Schmidtchen & Jenny Helstroffer & Christian Koboldt, 2021. "Regulatory failure and the polluter pays principle: why regulatory impact assessment dominates the polluter pays principle," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 23(1), pages 109-144, January.
    5. Mark Koyama, 2014. "The law & economics of private prosecutions in industrial revolution England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 277-298, April.
    6. Julian Schumacher & Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, 2015. "What Explains Sovereign Debt Litigation?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3).
    7. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2012. "Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 157-174, July.
    8. Thomas J. Miceli, 2022. "Of Coase, Cattle, and Crime: Why the Becker Model is Compatible with a Moral Theory of Criminal Law," Working papers 2022-05, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    9. Benito Arruñada, 2021. "Umbrales y excepciones como fallo regulatorio," Studies on the Spanish Economy eee2021-20, FEDEA.
    10. Thomas J. Miceli, 2021. "Should Offenders’ Gains Be Counted? On Efficient Crimes and Unjust Laws," Working papers 2021-02, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    11. Massimo D’Antoni & Avraham D Tabbach, 2019. "The Complementary Role of Liability and Safety Regulation," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 21(1), pages 150-183.
    12. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Regulatory Takings," Working papers 2011-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    13. María Alexandra Ortiz Cabrera, 2019. "Colección Enrique Low Murtra, Tomo XII. Derecho Económico," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1114.
    14. Harshil Kaur & Rajendra P. Kundu, 2020. "Efficient Liability Assignment: Is Coupling a Necessity?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(3), pages 2388-2394.
    15. J.A. den Hertog, 2010. "Review of economic theories of regulation," Working Papers 10-18, Utrecht School of Economics.
    16. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2017. "Optimal Liability when Consumers Mispredict Product Usage," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 19(1), pages 202-243.
    17. Mostafa Beshkar & Jee-Hyeong Park, 2017. "Dispute Settlement with Second-Order Uncertainty: The Case of International Trade Disputes," CAEPR Working Papers 2017-010, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    18. Menusch Khadjavi, 2018. "Deterrence works for criminals," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 46(1), pages 165-178, August.
    19. Sophie Bienenstock, 2019. "The Deterrent Effect of French Liability Law: the Example of Abusive Contract Terms," Post-Print hal-03222207, HAL.
    20. Alberto Galasso & Hong Luo, 2018. "Punishing Robots: Issues in the Economics of Tort Liability and Innovation in Artificial Intelligence," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda, pages 493-504, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:telpol:v:36:y:2012:i:7:p:522-530. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/30471/description#description .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.