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How do clinical quality and patient satisfaction vary with provider size in primary care? Evidence from English general practice panel data

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  • Gravelle, Hugh
  • Liu, Dan
  • Santos, Rita

Abstract

We examine the relationship between general practice list size and measures of clinical quality and patient satisfaction. Using data on all English practices from 2005/6 to 2016/17, we estimate practice level models with rich data on patient demographics, deprivation, and morbidity. We use lagged list size to allow for potential simultaneity bias from the effect of quality on list size. We compare results from three different estimation methods: pooled ordinary least squares, random practice effects, fixed practice effects. With all three estimation methods increased list size is associated with reductions in all four measures of patient satisfaction. Increases in list size are associated with worse performance on three clinical quality indicators and better performance on three, though the precision and size of the associations varies with the estimation method. The absolute values of the elasticities of the ten quality indicators with respect to list size are small: in all cases a 10% change in list size would change quality by less than 1%. The lack of evidence that large practices have markedly better quality suggests that encouraging practices to form larger, but looser, groupings, may not, in itself, improve their performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Gravelle, Hugh & Liu, Dan & Santos, Rita, 2022. "How do clinical quality and patient satisfaction vary with provider size in primary care? Evidence from English general practice panel data," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 301(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:socmed:v:301:y:2022:i:c:s0277953622002428
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2022.114936
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Encinosa III, William E. & Gaynor, Martin & Rebitzer, James B., 2007. "The sociology of groups and the economics of incentives: Theory and evidence on compensation systems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 187-214, February.
    2. Jeffrey M Wooldridge, 2010. "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262232588, December.
    3. Rita Santos & Hugh Gravelle & Carol Propper, 2017. "Does Quality Affect Patients’ Choice of Doctor? Evidence from England," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(600), pages 445-494, March.
    4. Hugh Gravelle & Matt Sutton & Ada Ma, 2010. "Doctor Behaviour under a Pay for Performance Contract: Treating, Cheating and Case Finding?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(542), pages 129-156, February.
    5. Joseph P. Newhouse, 1973. "The Economics of Group Practice," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 8(1), pages 37-56.
    6. Rita Santos & Hugh Gravelle & Carol Propper, 2017. "Does Quality Affect Patients’ Choice of Doctor? Evidence from England," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(600), pages 445-494, March.
    7. Martin Gaynor & Paul Gertler, 1995. "Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 591-613, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kovacevic, Lana & Naik, Ravi & Lugo-Palacios, David G. & Ashrafian, Hutan & Mossialos, Elias & Darzi, Ara, 2023. "The impact of collaborative organisational models and general practice size on patient safety and quality of care in the English National Health Service: A systematic review," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    General practice; Primary care; Size; Clinical quality; Patient satisfaction; England;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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