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The dilemma between economic development and environmental protection: How political leadership turnover influences urban air pollution in China?

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  • Junsong Wang

    (East China Normal University
    East China Normal University)

  • Bingquan Lin

    (East China Normal University
    Jiangsu College of Administration)

Abstract

The dilemma between economic development and environmental protection has gained widespread attention, but limited research from the perspective of political business cycles exists. By utilizing detailed official turnover datasets and two-way fixed effect models, this study investigates the impact of political turnovers of city leaders on changes in urban PM2.5 (particulate matter 2.5) density in China. It examines how different stages of a leader’s tenure contribute to these changes and considers their potential connection to the performance-based cadre evaluation system that drives government turnovers in China. The study finds that prior to turnover, mayors tend to relax environmental regulations, leading to an 1.5% increase in PM2.5 density. However, during the second years after the mayor has taken office, air quality improves, with a 1% decrease in PM2.5 density. The effect of political business cycles on air quality is heterogeneous across cities with varying financial conditions, innovative capacity, and population size. The findings provide evidence that environmental protection might be sacrificed for economic development in the period prior turnover, particularly in cities with lower development levels. These insights can assist the government in considering how political cycles and the heterogeneous regional characteristics can be adjusted to promote environmental protection.

Suggested Citation

  • Junsong Wang & Bingquan Lin, 2024. "The dilemma between economic development and environmental protection: How political leadership turnover influences urban air pollution in China?," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 26(9), pages 23663-23681, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:endesu:v:26:y:2024:i:9:d:10.1007_s10668-023-03617-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10668-023-03617-y
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