Self-report to self-control? A note
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DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2012.07.006
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Cited by:
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- Mungan, Murat C., 2014. "A behavioral justification for escalating punishment schemes," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 189-197.
- Tim Friehe & Christoph Rößler & Xiaoge Dong, 2020.
"Liability for Third-Party Harm When Harm-Inflicting Consumers Are Present Biased,"
American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 22(1), pages 75-104.
- Friehe, Tim & Rössler, Christoph & Dong, Xiaoge, 2018. "Liability for third-party harm when harm-inflicting consumers are present biased," ILE Working Paper Series 20, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Crime; Escalating penalties; Self-reporting;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- K - Law and Economics
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