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Some differences in revealed behaviour under different inquiry methods

Author

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  • Ottone, Stefania
  • Ortona, Guido
  • Ponzano, Ferruccio
  • Scacciati, Francesco

Abstract

The paper is devoted to the assessment of the relevance of the they-come-to-play effect (CTPE, defined in the text). It employs both a real-effort setting and a questionnaire. The effect proves to be significant, albeit the results cannot be generalized straightforwardly. From the comparison between the real-effort setting and the questionnaire it turns out that subjects are influenced by their political preferences only in the latter.

Suggested Citation

  • Ottone, Stefania & Ortona, Guido & Ponzano, Ferruccio & Scacciati, Francesco, 2010. "Some differences in revealed behaviour under different inquiry methods," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 546-553, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:39:y:2010:i:5:p:546-553
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    6. Giuranno, Michele, 2009. "The logic of party coalitions with political activism and public financing," POLIS Working Papers 134, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Real-effort experiments Questionnaire Come-to-play effect Strategy method;

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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