Midnight regulations and the Cinderella effect
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- Jerry Ellig & Patrick A. McLaughlin & John F. Morrall III, 2013. "Continuity, change, and priorities: The quality and use of regulatory analysis across US administrations," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(2), pages 153-173, June.
- Dima Yazji Shamoun & Bruce Yandle, 2016. "Asserting presidential preferences in a regulatory review bureaucracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 87-111, January.
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Keywords
Midnight Regulation Cinderella Lame Duck Federal Register Regulatory President Administration;Statistics
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