IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/reveco/v27y2013icp383-405.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Irrational confidence, imperfect and long-lived information

Author

Listed:
  • Zhou, Deqing

Abstract

We analyze a dynamic framework where an informed agent overestimates or underestimates the precision of his noisy private signal. We investigate the effect of the insider's belief on equilibrium results such as the price informativeness, the liquidity cost, the trading strategy and the expected trading volume. Interestingly, we find that irrationality can yield contrarian trading in the sense that the two successive order imbalances are negatively correlated. Thus, irrationality, distinguished from dissimulation and manipulation, may underlie insiders' trading decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhou, Deqing, 2013. "Irrational confidence, imperfect and long-lived information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 383-405.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:27:y:2013:i:c:p:383-405
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2012.11.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056012001323
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.iref.2012.11.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gervais, Simon & Odean, Terrance, 2001. "Learning to be Overconfident," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(1), pages 1-27.
    2. Terrance Odean., 1996. "Volume, Volatility, Price and Profit When All Trader Are Above Average," Research Program in Finance Working Papers RPF-266, University of California at Berkeley.
    3. Hirshleifer, David & Luo, Guo Ying, 2001. "On the survival of overconfident traders in a competitive securities market," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 73-84, January.
    4. Brooks, Raymond M, 1994. "Bid-Ask Spread Components around Anticipated Announcements," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 17(3), pages 375-386, Fall.
    5. Kyle, Albert S & Wang, F Albert, 1997. "Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 2073-2090, December.
    6. Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. "Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 247-270, March.
    7. Diego García & Francesco Sangiorgi & Branko Urošević, 2007. "Overconfidence and Market Efficiency with Heterogeneous Agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 313-336, February.
    8. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:6:p:1839-1885 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Huddart, Steven & Hughes, John S & Levine, Carolyn B, 2001. "Public Disclosure and Dissimulation of Insider Trades," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 665-681, May.
    10. Zhou, Deqing, 2012. "Overconfidence, public disclosure and long-lived information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 626-630.
    11. Benos, Alexandros V., 1998. "Aggressiveness and survival of overconfident traders," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 353-383, September.
    12. Markus Glaser & Martin Weber, 2007. "Overconfidence and trading volume," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 32(1), pages 1-36, June.
    13. Bernhardt, Dan & Hughson, Eric, 2002. "Intraday trade in dealership markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(9), pages 1697-1732, October.
    14. Ko, K. Jeremy & (James) Huang, Zhijian, 2007. "Arrogance can be a virtue: Overconfidence, information acquisition, and market efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 529-560, May.
    15. Wang, F. Albert, 2001. "Overconfidence, Investor Sentiment, and Evolution," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 138-170, April.
    16. Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer, 1988. "A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price Variability," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 3-40.
    17. Albert Wang, F., 1998. "Strategic trading, asymmetric information and heterogeneous prior beliefs," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 321-352, September.
    18. Zhou, Deqing, 2011. "Overconfidence on public information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 239-242, September.
    19. Raymond M. Brooks, 1994. "Bid-Ask Spread Components Around Anticipated Announcements," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 17(3), pages 375-386, September.
    20. Gong, Fuzhou & Liu, Hong, 2012. "Inside trading, public disclosure and imperfect competition," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 200-223.
    21. Krinsky, Itzhak & Lee, Jason, 1996. "Earnings Announcements and the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1523-1535, September.
    22. Kerry Back & C. Henry Cao & Gregory A. Willard, 2000. "Imperfect Competition among Informed Traders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 2117-2155, October.
    23. Cheng, Louis T.W. & Davidson III, Wallace N. & Leung, T.Y., 2011. "Insider trading returns and dividend signals," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 421-429, June.
    24. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    25. Vo, Minh T., 2008. "Strategic trading when some investors receive information before others," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 319-332.
    26. repec:bla:jfinan:v:53:y:1998:i:6:p:1887-1934 is not listed on IDEAS
    27. I. Krinsky & J. Lee, 1996. "Earning Announcements and the Components of the Bid-Ask Aspread," Quantitative Studies in Economics and Population Research Reports 313, McMaster University.
    28. Foster, F Douglas & Viswanathan, S, 1996. "Strategic Trading When Agents Forecast the Forecasts of Others," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(4), pages 1437-1478, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Hsiang-Hsi & Chuang, Wen-I & Huang, Jih-Jeng & Chen, Yu-Hao, 2016. "The overconfident trading behavior of individual versus institutional investors," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 518-539.
    2. Zhou, Deqing, 2015. "The virtue of overconfidence when you are not perfectly informed," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 105-110.
    3. Liu, Jiapeng & Tao, Qizhi & Hou, Wenxuan & Zhang, Ting, 2016. "Systematic risk, government policy intervention, and dynamic contrarian investments," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 334-343.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gong, Fuzhou & Liu, Hong, 2016. "Asymmetric information, heterogeneous prior beliefs, and public information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 100-120.
    2. repec:bla:jfinan:v:59:y:2004:i:1:p:339-390 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Zhou, Deqing, 2015. "The virtue of overconfidence when you are not perfectly informed," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 105-110.
    4. Du, Sarina & Liu, Hong, 2015. "The overconfident trader does not always overreact to his information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 384-390.
    5. Jiang, Ying & Liu, Hong, 2022. "Insider trading, overconfidence, and private information flow," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    6. Chuang, Wen-I & Lee, Bong-Soo, 2006. "An empirical evaluation of the overconfidence hypothesis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(9), pages 2489-2515, September.
    7. Kenneth Yung & Yen-Chih Liu, 2009. "Implications of futures trading volume: Hedgers versus speculators," Journal of Asset Management, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(5), pages 318-337, December.
    8. Markus Glaser & Thomas Langer & Martin Weber, 2007. "On the Trend Recognition and Forecasting Ability of Professional Traders," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 4(4), pages 176-193, December.
    9. Markus Glaser & Martin Weber, 2007. "Overconfidence and trading volume," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 32(1), pages 1-36, June.
    10. Yamani, Ehab, 2023. "Return–volume nexus in financial markets: A survey of research," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    11. Liu, Hong & Qi, Lina & Li, Zaili, 2019. "Insider trading, representativeness heuristic insider, and market regulation," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 48-64.
    12. Zhou, Deqing & Wang, Wenjie, 2020. "Insider, outsider and information heterogeneity," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    13. Diego García & Francesco Sangiorgi & Branko Urošević, 2007. "Overconfidence and Market Efficiency with Heterogeneous Agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(2), pages 313-336, February.
    14. Laurent Germain & Fabrice Rousseau & Anne Vanhems, 2014. "Irrational Market Makers," Finance, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, vol. 35(1), pages 107-145.
    15. Zhou, Deqing & Zhen, Fang, 2021. "Risk aversion, informative noise trading, and long-lived information," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 247-254.
    16. Nosic, Alen & Weber, Martin, 2007. "Determinants of Risk Taking Behavior: The role of Risk Attitudes, Risk Perceptions and Beliefs," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 07-56, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
    17. Glaser, Markus & Weber, Martin, 2009. "Which past returns affect trading volume?," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 1-31, February.
    18. Glaser, Markus & Nöth, Markus & Weber, Martin, 2003. "Behavioral finance," Papers 03-14, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    19. Liu, Hong & Du, Sarina, 2016. "Can an overconfident insider coexist with a representativeness heuristic insider?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 170-177.
    20. Paolo Colla & Antonio Mele, 2010. "Information Linkages and Correlated Trading," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(1), pages 203-246, January.
    21. Ko, K. Jeremy & (James) Huang, Zhijian, 2007. "Arrogance can be a virtue: Overconfidence, information acquisition, and market efficiency," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 529-560, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Informed trading; Information asymmetry; Overconfidence; Contrarian trading;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:27:y:2013:i:c:p:383-405. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620165 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.