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Potential cost implications of contracting risks – the views of bus operators in South Africa

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  • Walters, Jackie

Abstract

In South Africa, like many countries internationally, public transport contracting costs are continuously being scrutinised in the light of tight economic circumstances. In designing public transport contracts it is important that an appropriate risk-share dispensation be considered to ensure that the relevant entity (the authority and/or operator) carries the risk that it is best suited to manage. Inappropriate risk-sharing arrangements can result in additional costs being factored into contract bids by operators thus increasing the overall cost of public transport for the authority. In addition, the design of the contract e.g. net cost versus gross cost (and associated risk apportionment) could have a bearing on the ultimate cost of the contract.

Suggested Citation

  • Walters, Jackie, 2018. "Potential cost implications of contracting risks – the views of bus operators in South Africa," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 235-244.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:retrec:v:69:y:2018:i:c:p:235-244
    DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2018.03.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stanley, John & van de Velde, Didier, 2008. "Risk and reward in public transport contracting," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 20-25, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Das, Amit Kumar & Bardhan, Amit Kumar & Fageda, Xavier, 2020. "New regional aviation policy in India: Early indicators and lessons learnt," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    2. Walters, Jackie, 2020. "Understanding bidder behaviour: The case of the Mamelodi contract," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public transport contracting; Public transport contract risks; Operator risk views; Risks in public transport contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
    • M11 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Production Management
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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