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Inter-jurisdiction subsidy competition for a new production plant: What is the central government optimal policy?

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  • Parcero, O.J.

Abstract

This paper models inter-jurisdiction competition for foreign direct investment and optimal government policy intervention to protect the national interest. The inter-jurisdiction competition for a multinational has the potential of favouring the multinational and of becoming detrimental for the host country. The central government wants to limit such competition but it cannot tax-discriminate between different types of multinationals. We find that the central government would use tax policy to create asymmetries even when the underlying structure is symmetrical. This offers a novel explanation for the creation of 'Special Economic Zones' in many countries, which are well known to be aimed at the attraction of foreign direct investment.

Suggested Citation

  • Parcero, O.J., 2007. "Inter-jurisdiction subsidy competition for a new production plant: What is the central government optimal policy?," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 688-702, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:37:y:2007:i:6:p:688-702
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Osiris J. Parcero, 2009. "Optimal country's policy towards multinationals when local regions can choose between firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies," Working Papers 2009/34, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    2. Yang, Yong-cong & Nie, Pu-yan & Liu, Hui-ting & Shen, Ming-hao, 2018. "On the welfare effects of subsidy game for renewable energy investment: Toward a dynamic equilibrium model," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 420-428.
    3. Osiris J. Parcero, 2009. "Optimal country's policy towards multinationals when local regions can choose between firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies," Working Papers 2009/34, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).

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