Reserve prices in all-pay auctions with complete information
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DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2016.06.001
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Oliver Kirchkamp & Wladislaw Mill, 2019. "Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding," CESifo Working Paper Series 7631, CESifo.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury, 2017.
"The All‐Pay Auction with Nonmonotonic Payoff,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(2), pages 375-390, October.
- Subhasish Modak Chowdhury, 2010. "The All-Pay Auction with Non-Monotonic Payoff," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2010-06, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Shelegia, Sandro & Wilson, Chris M., 2022. "Costly participation and default allocations in all-pay contests," MPRA Paper 115027, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Kirchkamp, Oliver & Mill, Wladislaw, 2021. "Spite vs. risk: Explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 616-635.
- Etro, Federico, 2017. "Research in economics and game theory. A 70th anniversary," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 1-7.
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Keywords
All-pay auctions; Reserve price; Economic theory of lobbying;All these keywords.
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