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Risk perceptions, voluntary contributions and environmental policy

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  • Etner, Johanna
  • Jeleva, Meglena
  • Jouvet, Pierre-Andre

Abstract

This article study the impact of risk perception on environmental policy. The environmental quality is uncertain and can be improved by voluntary contributions. We introduce then an heterogeneity in individuals' risk perceptions. In this context, the social optimum can be decentralized by tax financed government subsidies to private provision. We distinguish the case of a government who represents perfectly agents' preferences from the case of a government with its own risk preferences. In the two cases, we show that neutrality still holds
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  • Etner, Johanna & Jeleva, Meglena & Jouvet, Pierre-Andre, 2007. "Risk perceptions, voluntary contributions and environmental policy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 130-139, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:61:y:2007:i:3:p:130-139
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    6. Johanna Etner & Meglena Jeleva & Pierre‐Andre Jouvet, 2009. "Pessimism Or Optimism: A Justification To Voluntary Contributions Toward Environmental Quality," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 308-319, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin Ouvrard & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Environmental Incentives: Nudge or Tax?," Working Papers of BETA 2016-23, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    2. Boun My, Kene & Ouvrard, Benjamin, 2019. "Nudge and tax in an environmental public goods experiment: Does environmental sensitivity matter?," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 24-48.
    3. Langlais, Eric, 2010. "Safety and the Allocation of Costs in Large Accidents," MPRA Paper 25710, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Benjamin Ouvrard & Sandrine Spaeter, 2016. "Environmental Incentives: Nudge or Tax?," Working Papers 2016.15, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    5. Montoya-Villalobos, Maria J., 2023. "Green consumption: The role of confidence and pessimism," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other
    • D69 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Other
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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