IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/quaeco/v86y2022icp124-133.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Excess cash holdings and firm performance in new and old economy firms

Author

Listed:
  • Banjade, Dhruba
  • Diltz, J. David

Abstract

This study examines the relationship between excess cash holdings and firm performance in new and old economy firms. Firm value increases with cash on hand to a point, but it declines as cash balances exceed an empirically estimated threshold we term “the optimal level”. We find that firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms hold more cash than firms with strong ones. Cash holdings decrease by nearly four percent as bank ownership increases by one percent. New economy firms spend more on research and development activities, and they hold nearly six percent more cash than old economy firms. Results strengthen when we control for year and industry effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Banjade, Dhruba & Diltz, J. David, 2022. "Excess cash holdings and firm performance in new and old economy firms," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 124-133.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:86:y:2022:i:c:p:124-133
    DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2022.06.006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S106297692200076X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.qref.2022.06.006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomas W. Bates & Kathleen M. Kahle & René M. Stulz, 2009. "Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used To?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 1985-2021, October.
    2. Murphy, Kevin J., 2003. "Stock-based pay in new economy firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 129-147, January.
    3. Sanyun Zeng & Lihong Wang, 2015. "CEO gender and corporate cash holdings. Are female CEOs more conservative?," Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 449-474, December.
    4. Ozkan, Aydin & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2004. "Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation of UK companies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 2103-2134, September.
    5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    6. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 107-156.
    7. Jarrad Harford & Sattar A. Mansi & William F. Maxwell, 2012. "Corporate Governance and Firm Cash Holdings in the U.S," Springer Books, in: Sabri Boubaker & Bang Dang Nguyen & Duc Khuong Nguyen (ed.), Corporate Governance, edition 127, pages 107-138, Springer.
    8. Kusnadi, Yuanto, 2011. "Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm value?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 554-570, November.
    9. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    10. Esteban García‐Canal & Mauro F. Guillén, 2008. "Risk and the strategy of foreign location choice in regulated industries," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(10), pages 1097-1115, October.
    11. Opler, Tim & Pinkowitz, Lee & Stulz, Rene & Williamson, Rohan, 1999. "The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 3-46, April.
    12. Smith, Clifford Jr., 1986. "Investment banking and the capital acquisition process," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 3-29.
    13. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, 2006. "Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 655-687, April.
    14. Narjess Boubakri, 2011. "Corporate Governance and Issues From the Insurance Industry," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 78(3), pages 501-518, September.
    15. Barclay, Michael J & Smith, Clifford W, Jr, 1995. "The Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(2), pages 609-631, June.
    16. Kin-Wai Lee & Cheng-Few Lee, 2009. "Cash Holdings, Corporate Governance Structure and Firm Valuation," Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies (RPBFMP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 12(03), pages 475-508.
    17. Edwards, Franklin R, 1977. "Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(1), pages 147-162, February.
    18. Yenn‐Ru Chen, 2008. "Corporate Governance and Cash Holdings: Listed New Economy versus Old Economy Firms," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 430-442, September.
    19. Laurent Fresard, 2010. "Financial Strength and Product Market Behavior: The Real Effects of Corporate Cash Holdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1097-1122, June.
    20. Huang, Winifred & Mazouz, Khelifa, 2018. "Excess cash, trading continuity, and liquidity risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 275-291.
    21. Miguel A. Ferreira & Antonio S. Vilela, 2004. "Why Do Firms Hold Cash? Evidence from EMU Countries," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 10(2), pages 295-319, June.
    22. Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, 2003. "Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2351-2374, December.
    23. Laurent Fresard, 2010. "Financial Strength and Product Market Behavior: The Real Effects of Corporate Cash Holdings," Post-Print hal-00537081, HAL.
    24. Ebenezer Asem & Shamsul Alam, 2014. "Cash Hoards And Changes In Investors' Outlook," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 37(1), pages 119-137, February.
    25. Li, Xiafei & Luo, Di, 2020. "Increase in cash holdings of U.S. firms: The role of healthcare and technology industries," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 286-298.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Pascal Nguyen & Nahid Rahman, 2020. "Institutional ownership, cross‐shareholdings and corporate cash reserves in Japan," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(S1), pages 1175-1207, April.
    2. Maurizio Rocca & Raffaele Staglianò & Tiziana Rocca & Alfio Cariola & Ekaterina Skatova, 2019. "Cash holdings and SME performance in Europe: the role of firm-specific and macroeconomic moderators," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1051-1078, December.
    3. Jianqiao Huang & Yunsen Chen & Xin Dai & Xiaoran Ni, 2022. "Stock market liberalisation and corporate cash holdings: evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(S1), pages 1925-1955, April.
    4. Tahir Akhtar & Mohammad Ali Tareq & Kashif Rashid, 2021. "Chief Executive Officers’ monitoring, board effectiveness, managerial ownership, and cash holdings: evidence from ASEAN," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 15(8), pages 2193-2238, November.
    5. Huang, Winifred & Mazouz, Khelifa, 2018. "Excess cash, trading continuity, and liquidity risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 275-291.
    6. Tosun, Onur Kemel & El Kalak, Izidin & Hudson, Robert, 2022. "How female directors help firms to attain optimal cash holdings," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    7. Gao, Ning, 2015. "The motives of cash reserve and bidder cash reserve effects," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 73-88.
    8. Sabeeh Ullah & Yasir Kamal, 2017. "Board Characteristics, Political Connections, and Corporate Cash Holdings: The Role of Firm Size and Political Regime," Business & Economic Review, Institute of Management Sciences, Peshawar, Pakistan, vol. 9(1), pages 157-179, March.
    9. Khalil Jebran & Shihua Chen & Muhammad Zubair Tauni & Hassan Ahmad, 2019. "Corporate Governance, Ultimate Owner, and Target Cash Holdings: Evidence From China," SAGE Open, , vol. 9(4), pages 21582440198, December.
    10. Jan Felix Weidemann, 2018. "A state-of-the-art review of corporate cash holding research," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 88(6), pages 765-797, August.
    11. Tiziana La Rocca & Maurizio La Rocca & Francesco Fasano & Alfio Cariola, 2023. "Does a country's environmental policy affect the value of small and medium sized enterprises liquidity in the energy sector?," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(1), pages 277-290, January.
    12. Amess, Kevin & Banerji, Sanjay & Lampousis, Athanasios, 2015. "Corporate cash holdings: Causes and consequences," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 421-433.
    13. Yao, Youfu & Hong, Yun, 2023. "Can comment letters impact excess cash holdings? Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 900-922.
    14. Malik Abu Afifa & Isam Saleh & Fadi Haniah, 2021. "Direct and Mediated Associations Among Ownership Structure, Cash Holdings and Firm Value: The Case of Jordanian Insurance Firms," Vision, , vol. 25(4), pages 471-482, December.
    15. Sun, Wenyi & Yin, Chao & Zeng, Yeqin, 2023. "Precautionary motive or private benefit motive for holding cash: Evidence from CEO ownership," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    16. Chen, Naiwei & Yu, Min-Teh, 2021. "National Governance and Corporate Liquidity in Organization of Islamic Cooperation Countries: Evidence based on a Sharia-compliant Liquidity Measure," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(C).
    17. Marc B.J. Schauten & Dick van Dijk & Jan†Paul van der Waal, 2013. "Corporate Governance and the Value of Excess Cash Holdings of Large European Firms," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 19(5), pages 991-1016, November.
    18. Saleh F. A. Khatib & Dewi Fariha Abdullah & Ernie Hendrawaty & Ahmed A. Elamer, 2022. "A bibliometric analysis of cash holdings literature: current status, development, and agenda for future research," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 707-744, September.
    19. Ernie Hendrawaty, 2019. "Value of Excess Cash Holdings of Financially Unconstrained Companies," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 13(3), September.
    20. Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello & Igor Cunha & Michael S. Weisbach, 2014. "Corporate Liquidity Management: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 135-162, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:86:y:2022:i:c:p:124-133. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620167 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.