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Warning labels as cheap-talk: why regulators ban drugs

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  • Hanson, Robin

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  • Hanson, Robin, 2003. "Warning labels as cheap-talk: why regulators ban drugs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2013-2029, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:9-10:p:2013-2029
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    1. Boyes, William J & Marlow, Michael L, 1996. "The Public Demand for Smoking Bans," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 88(1-2), pages 57-67, July.
    2. Jonathan Gruber, 2001. "Tobacco at the Crossroads: The Past and Future of Smoking Regulation in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 193-212, Spring.
    3. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    4. Leland, Hayne E, 1979. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1328-1346, December.
    5. Avner Shared & John Sutton, 1981. "The Self-Regulating Profession," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(2), pages 217-234.
    6. Michael Spence, 1977. "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 561-572.
    7. Maurizi, Alex, 1974. "Occupational Licensing and the Public Interest," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(2), pages 399-413, Part I, M.
    8. Gale, Douglas, 1997. "Spoiled for choice: variety and efficiency in markets with incomplete information," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 41-67, April.
    9. New, Bill, 1999. "Paternalism and Public Policy," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 63-83, April.
    10. Dale H. Gieringer, 1985. "The Safety and Efficacy of New Drug Approval," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(1), pages 177-201, Spring/Su.
    11. Carl Shapiro, 1986. "Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(5), pages 843-862.
    12. Leffler, Keith B, 1978. "Physician Licensure: Competition and Monopoly in American Medicine," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 165-186, April.
    13. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Francesca Barigozzi & Bertrand Villeneuve, 2006. "The Signaling Effect of Tax Policy," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(4), pages 611-630, October.
    2. Caleb S. Fuller, 2018. "Privacy law as price control," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 225-250, April.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5402 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Levit, Doron, 2017. "Advising shareholders in takeovers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(3), pages 614-634.

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