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Exclusion and moral hazard: A further analysis

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  • Fraser, Clive D.

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  • Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "Exclusion and moral hazard: A further analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 295-301, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:60:y:1996:i:2:p:295-301
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Optimal Public Good Provision with Limited Lump-Sum Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 153-166, March.
    2. Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "On the provision of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 111-130, April.
    3. Silva, Emilson C. D. & Kahn, Charles M., 1993. "Exclusion and moral hazard : The case of identical demand," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 217-235, September.
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    1. Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "On the provision of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 111-130, April.
    2. Martin Besfamille & Nicolás Figueroa & León Guzmán, 2022. "Fare Evasion and Monopoly Regulation," Documentos de Trabajo 566, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..

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