Exclusion and moral hazard : The case of identical demand
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Cited by:
- Kahn, Charles M. & Roberds, William, 2008.
"Credit and identity theft,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 251-264, March.
- Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2005. "Credit and identity theft," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2005. "Credit and identity theft," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2005-19, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Charles M. Kahn & William Roberds, 2006. "Credit and Identity Theft," 2006 Meeting Papers 34, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996.
"On the optimality of allowing collusion,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion," Working Papers 93-02, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1993. "On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 93-02, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "On the provision of excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 111-130, April.
- Ramos, Raúl & Silva, Hugo E., 2023. "Fare evasion in public transport: How does it affect the optimal design and pricing?," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
- Martin Besfamille & Nicolás Figueroa & León Guzmán, 2023.
"Ramsey pricing revisited: Natural monopoly regulation with evaders,"
Documentos de Trabajo
576, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Martin Besfamille & Nicolás Figueroa & Léon Guzmán, 2023. "Ramsey Pricing Revisited: Natural Monopoly Regulation with Evaders," CESifo Working Paper Series 10732, CESifo.
- Kurtis J. Swope & Eckhard Janeba, 2005.
"Taxes or Fees? The Political Economy of Providing Excludable Public Goods,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(3), pages 405-426, August.
- Kurtis J. Swope & Eckhard Janeba, 2001. "Taxes or Fees? The Political Economy of Providing Excludable Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series 542, CESifo.
- Silva, Emilson C. D., 1997. "A-la-Carte or Smorgasbord? Multiproduct Clubs with Costly Exclusion," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 264-280, March.
- Emilson C.D. Silva & Chikara Yamaguchi, 2018. "Overlapping Climate Clubs under Transaction Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 7319, CESifo.
- Martin Besfamille & Nicolás Figueroa & León Guzmán, 2022.
"Fare Evasion and Monopoly Regulation,"
Documentos de Trabajo
566, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- Martin Besfamille & Nicolás Figueroa & León Guzmán, 2022. "Fare Evasion and Monopoly Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 9592, CESifo.
- Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva & Richard Corne, 2014. "Prestige Clubs," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41st Brazilian Economics Meeting] 131, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
- Dearden, James A., 1997. "Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 153-174, October.
- Fraser, Clive D., 1996. "Exclusion and moral hazard: A further analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 295-301, May.
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