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Incentives in government contracts

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  • Reichelstein, Stefan
  • Osband, Kent

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  • Reichelstein, Stefan & Osband, Kent, 1984. "Incentives in government contracts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 257-270, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:24:y:1984:i:2:p:257-270
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomson, William, 1979. "Eliciting production possibilities from a well-informed manager," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 360-380, June.
    2. Bonin, John P, 1976. "On the Design of Managerial Incentive Structures in a Decentralized Planning Environment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(4), pages 682-687, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Markus C. Arnold & Eva Ponick, 2006. "Kommunikation im Groves-Mechanismus — Ergebnisse eines Laborexperiments," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 89-120, February.
    2. Arleta Rasmußen, 2015. "Reporting behavior: a literature review of experimental studies," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(2), pages 283-311, June.
    3. Gneiting, Tilmann, 2011. "Making and Evaluating Point Forecasts," Journal of the American Statistical Association, American Statistical Association, vol. 106(494), pages 746-762.
    4. Martini, Jan Thomas & Niemann, Rainer & Simons, Dirk, 2007. "Transfer pricing or formula apportionment? Tax-induced distortions of multinationals' investment and production decisions," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 27, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    5. Alison J. Kirby, 1992. "Incentive compensation schemes: Experimental calibration of the rationality hypothesis," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(2), pages 374-408, March.
    6. Gneiting, Tilmann, 2011. "Quantiles as optimal point forecasts," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 197-207, April.
    7. Jörg Beißel & Volker Bilgram, 2003. "Implementierung erfolgsorientierter Entlohnungssysteme — Ein Praxisbeispiel bei der Vergabe von Planungsleistungen im Baugewerbe," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 315-335, May.
    8. Feldmann, Martin & Müller, Stephanie, 2003. "An incentive scheme for true information providing in Supply Chains," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 63-73, April.
    9. Jan Thomas Martini & Rainer Niemann & Dirk Simons, 2007. "Transfer Pricing or Formula Apportionment? Tax-Induced Distortions of Multinationals’ Investment and Production Decisions," CESifo Working Paper Series 2020, CESifo.
    10. Gneiting, Tilmann, 2011. "Quantiles as optimal point forecasts," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 197-207.
    11. Alexis H. Kunz & Thomas Pfeiffer, 1999. "Investitionsbudgetierung und implizite Verträge: Wie resistent ist der Groves-Mechanismus bei dynamischer Interaktion?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 203-223, March.
    12. Christian Lohmann & Sandro Lombardo, 2014. "Resource allocation within a budgeting game: truthful reporting as the dominant strategy under collusion," Metrika: International Journal for Theoretical and Applied Statistics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 33-54, September.

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