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Implementierung erfolgsorientierter Entlohnungssysteme — Ein Praxisbeispiel bei der Vergabe von Planungsleistungen im Baugewerbe

Author

Listed:
  • Jörg Beißel

    (Corporate Controlling der Deutschen Lufthansa AG)

  • Volker Bilgram

    (Zentralcontrolling der DB Netz AG)

Abstract

Summary In comparison with the vast amount of theoretical contributions in the field of principal-agent theory, there exists a distinct scarcity of literature on the subject of how its principal findings can be applied in reality. In this context, the following article seeks to address a point of criticism often voiced in connection with principal-agent analysis, namely that its assumptions and results are far too restrictive to be of any use for the solution of real-world incentive problems. In contrast, we show how a particular type of incentive scheme developed by Osband, Reichelstein and others is currently used by the German Federal Railway to reduce agency problems with respect to planning and design services of outside architects and engineers for major construction projects. In addition, some of the problems encountered during the implementation stage of the project are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Jörg Beißel & Volker Bilgram, 2003. "Implementierung erfolgsorientierter Entlohnungssysteme — Ein Praxisbeispiel bei der Vergabe von Planungsleistungen im Baugewerbe," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 315-335, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:55:y:2003:i:3:d:10.1007_bf03372707
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372707
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Reichelstein, Stefan & Osband, Kent, 1984. "Incentives in government contracts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 257-270, July.
    2. Osband, Kent & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1985. "Information-eliciting compensation schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 107-115, June.
    3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    4. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    5. Kirby, Aj & Reichelstein, S & Sen, Pk & Paik, Ty, 1991. "Participation, Slack, And Budget-Based Performance Evaluation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 109-128.
    6. Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
    7. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    8. Rick Antle & Gary D. Eppen, 1985. "Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 163-174, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    M10; D82; C72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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