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The venture capital entry model on game options with jump-diffusion process

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  • Ko, Chuan-Chuan
  • Lin, Tyrone T.
  • Yang, Chyan

Abstract

This paper aims to apply game options to construct the optimal decision-making and management tool for venture capital (VC) firms. This model emphasizes the inferences with game options on the market structures formed by different competition and investment strategies of the two VC firms to reflect the investment returns. These market structures are classified into an entry-deterred game (specific monopoly), a leader's dominated strategies (duopoly), and simultaneous investment. It is considered how to select investment timing to avoid any potential competitive threats in order to provide the optimal expected threshold values for the investment decisions of VC firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Ko, Chuan-Chuan & Lin, Tyrone T. & Yang, Chyan, 2011. "The venture capital entry model on game options with jump-diffusion process," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 87-94, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:proeco:v:134:y:2011:i:1:p:87-94
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dimitris Andriosopoulos & Michalis Doumpos & Panos M. Pardalos & Constantin Zopounidis, 2019. "Computational approaches and data analytics in financial services: A literature review," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 70(10), pages 1581-1599, October.
    2. Yanzhao Li & Ju'e Guo & Yongwu Li & Xu Zhang, 2021. "Optimal exit decision of venture capital under time-inconsistent preferences," Papers 2103.11557, arXiv.org.
    3. Qing He & Yaqin Liu & Qian Yu & Chao Wei, 2022. "Risk Dominance Analysis of R&D Investment Cooperation in Dynamic Option Game," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(1), pages 1-21, December.
    4. Wang, Juite & Yang, Chung-Yu, 2012. "Flexibility planning for managing R&D projects under risk," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(2), pages 823-831.
    5. Trigeorgis, Lenos & Tsekrekos, Andrianos E., 2018. "Real Options in Operations Research: A Review," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 270(1), pages 1-24.

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