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Promotion of cooperation induced by two-sided players in prisoner’s dilemma game

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  • Su, Zhen
  • Li, Lixiang
  • Xiao, Jinghua
  • Podobnik, B.
  • Stanley, H. Eugene

Abstract

We examine how real-world individuals and companies can either reach an agreement or fail to reach an agreement after several stages of negotiation. We use a modified prisoner’s dilemma game with two-sided players who can either cooperate or not cooperate with their neighbors. We find that the presence of even a small number of these two-sided players substantially promotes the cooperation because, unlike the rock–paper–scissors scenario, when the cooperators change to the non-cooperators to gain a payoff, they can turn to the two-sided players and continue negotiating. We find that the network structure influences the spread of strategies. Lattice and regular-random (RR) networks benefit the spread of both non-cooperation and two-sided strategies, but scale-free (SF) networks stop both strategies. We also find that the Erdös–Rényi (ER) network promotes the two-sided strategy and blocks the spread of non-cooperation. As the ER network density decreases, and the network degree is lowered the lifetime of non-cooperators increases. Our results expand our understanding of the role played by the two-sided strategy in the growth of the cooperative behavior in networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Su, Zhen & Li, Lixiang & Xiao, Jinghua & Podobnik, B. & Stanley, H. Eugene, 2018. "Promotion of cooperation induced by two-sided players in prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 490(C), pages 584-590.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:490:y:2018:i:c:p:584-590
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2017.08.117
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    3. Yang, Jing & Chen, Ya-Shan & Sun, Yichun & Yang, Han-Xin & Liu, Yu, 2018. "Group formation in the spatial public goods game with continuous strategies," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 505(C), pages 737-743.

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