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Proportional representation with uncertainty

Author

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  • De Sinopoli, Francesco
  • Iannantuoni, Giovanna
  • Manzoni, Elena
  • Pimienta, Carlos

Abstract

We introduce a model with strategic voting in a parliamentary election with proportional representation and uncertainty about the voter’s preferences. In any equilibrium of the model, most of the voters only vote for those parties whose positions are extreme. In the resulting parliament, a consensus government forms and the policy maximizing the sum of utilities of the members of the government is implemented.

Suggested Citation

  • De Sinopoli, Francesco & Iannantuoni, Giovanna & Manzoni, Elena & Pimienta, Carlos, 2019. "Proportional representation with uncertainty," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 18-23.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:99:y:2019:i:c:p:18-23
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.01.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2007. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(2), pages 267-286, January.
    2. Kedar, Orit, 2005. "When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancingin Parliamentary Elections," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(2), pages 185-199, May.
    3. Cho, Seok-Ju, 2014. "Voting Equilibria Under Proportional Representation," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 108(2), pages 281-296, May.
    4. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    5. David P. Baron & Daniel Diermeier, 2001. "Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 933-967.
    6. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 405-422, June.
    7. Duch, Raymond M. & May, Jeff & Armstrong, David A., 2010. "Coalition-directed Voting in Multiparty Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(4), pages 698-719, November.
    8. Ignacio Ortuno-Ortin & Anke Gerber, 1998. "Political compromise and endogenous formation of coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 445-454.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Balduzzi & Sandro Brusco, 2019. "Proportional Systems with Free Entry. A Citizen-Candidate Model," Department of Economics Working Papers 19-01, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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