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Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space

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  • Cressman, Ross

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  • Cressman, Ross, 2005. "Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 127-147, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:50:y:2005:i:2:p:127-147
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    1. Oechssler, Jorg & Riedel, Frank, 2002. "On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 223-252, December.
    2. Heifetz, Aviad & Shannon, Chris & Spiegel, Yossi, 2007. "What to maximize if you must," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 31-57, March.
    3. Moulin, Herve, 1984. "Dominance solvability and cournot stability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 83-102, February.
    4. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    5. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
    6. Ross Cressman, 2003. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033054, April.
    7. M. Doebeli & U. Dieckmann, 2000. "Evolutionary Branching and Sympatric Speciation Caused by Different Types of Ecological Interactions," Working Papers ir00040, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    8. P. Marrow & U. Dieckmann & R. Law, 1996. "Evolutionary Dynamics of Predator-Prey Systems: An Ecological Perspective," Working Papers wp96002, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
    9. P. Taylor & L. Jonker, 2010. "Evolutionarily Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 457, David K. Levine.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hofbauer, Josef & Oechssler, Jörg & Riedel, Frank, 2009. "Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 406-429, March.
    2. Ruijgrok, Matthijs & Ruijgrok, Theo, 2013. "An effective replicator equation for games with a continuous strategy set," MPRA Paper 52198, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Dharini Hingu, 2020. "Asymptotic stability of strongly uninvadable sets," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 737-749, April.
    4. Yannick Viossat, 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and dominated strategies," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(1), pages 91-113, April.
    5. Norman, Thomas W.L., 2008. "Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 610-627, March.
    6. Fernando Louge & Frank Riedel, 2012. "Evolutionary Stability in First Price Auctions," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 110-128, March.
    7. Dharini Hingu & K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao & A. J. Shaiju, 2018. "Evolutionary Stability of Polymorphic Population States in Continuous Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 141-156, March.
    8. Metzger, Lars Peter, 2014. "Invader strategies in the war of attrition with private information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 160-166.
    9. Georgiy Karev, 2020. "Dynamics of Strategy Distributions in a One-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space for Games with a Quadratic Payoff Function," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-12, March.
    10. Jean Rabanal & Daniel Friedman, 2014. "Incomplete Information, Dynamic Stability and the Evolution of Preferences: Two Examples," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 448-467, December.
    11. Dharini Hingu & K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao & A. J. Shaiju, 2020. "On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 751-760, April.
    12. Matthijs Veelen & Peter Spreij, 2009. "Evolution in games with a continuous action space," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(3), pages 355-376, June.
    13. Aradhana Narang & A. J. Shaiju, 2021. "Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 304(1), pages 343-359, September.
    14. Cressman, Ross & Hofbauer, Josef & Riedel, Frank, 2005. "Stability of the Replicator Equation for a Single-Species with a Multi-Dimensional Continuous Trait Space," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 12/2005, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
    15. Yannick Viossat, 2011. "Deterministic monotone dynamics and dominated strategies," Working Papers hal-00636620, HAL.
    16. Jie Jin & Jun Zhuang & Qiuhong Zhao, 2018. "Supervision after Certification: An Evolutionary Game Analysis for Chinese Environmental Labeled Enterprises," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(5), pages 1-22, May.
    17. Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    18. Cheung, Man-Wah, 2016. "Imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 206-223.
    19. Lahkar, Ratul & Riedel, Frank, 2015. "The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 268-282.
    20. Perkins, S. & Leslie, D.S., 2014. "Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 179-213.
    21. Lahkar, Ratul & Riedel, Frank, 2016. "The Continuous Logit Dynamic and Price Dispersion," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 521, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    22. repec:awi:wpaper:0424 is not listed on IDEAS

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