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Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously

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  • Sanver, M. Remzi

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  • Sanver, M. Remzi, 2002. "Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 151-155, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:151-155
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bilge Yilmaz & Murat R. Sertel, 1999. "The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 615-627.
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    Cited by:

    1. Woeginger, Gerhard J., 2003. "A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 347-354, December.
    2. Brandl, Florian & Peters, Dominik, 2022. "Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: A catalogue of characterizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    3. Aleksei Y. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 187-210, April.
    4. Jac C. Heckelman, 2023. "Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 27(1), pages 125-132, February.

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