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On expressing maximum information in extensive games

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  • Quesada, Antonio

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  • Quesada, Antonio, 2001. "On expressing maximum information in extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 161-167, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:42:y:2001:i:2:p:161-167
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bonanno, Giacomo, 1992. "Players' information in extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 35-48, August.
    2. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
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    Cited by:

    1. Giacomo Bonanno & Cédric Dégremont, 2013. "Logic and Game Theory," Working Papers 11, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    2. Giacomo Bonanno & Cédric Dégremont, 2013. "Logic and Game Theory," Working Papers 134, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

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