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Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences

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  • Arlegi, Ricardo
  • Teschl, Miriam

Abstract

We study, in a finite setting, the problem of Pareto rationalizability of choice functions by means of a preference profile that is single-peaked with respect to an exogenously given linear order over the alternatives. This problem requires a new condition to be added to those that characterize Pareto rationalizability in the general domain of orders (Moulin (1985)). This new condition appeals to the existence of a central range of options such that the choice function excludes alternatives which are distant from that range.

Suggested Citation

  • Arlegi, Ricardo & Teschl, Miriam, 2022. "Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 1-11.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:118:y:2022:i:c:p:1-11
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.05.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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