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The unbinding core for coalitional form games

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  • Abe, Takaaki
  • Funaki, Yukihiko

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a new core concept called the unbinding core by extending the definition of a deviation. In the traditional definition, players deviate if a profitable allocation exists after their deviation, while our new definition requires that all possible allocations are profitable. Therefore, the unbinding core becomes a superset of the traditional core. We examine some properties of the unbinding core. A sufficient condition for the unbinding core to be nonempty is also provided.

Suggested Citation

  • Abe, Takaaki & Funaki, Yukihiko, 2021. "The unbinding core for coalitional form games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 39-42.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:113:y:2021:i:c:p:39-42
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.007
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