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The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty

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  • Németh, Tibor
  • Pintér, Miklós

Abstract

The weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty (Habis and Herings, 2011) is considered. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the weak sequential core. We show that a transferable utility game with uncertainty has a non-empty weak sequential core if and only if it is uniformly P-balanced on the cores.

Suggested Citation

  • Németh, Tibor & Pintér, Miklós, 2017. "The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 1-6.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:69:y:2017:i:c:p:1-6
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.12.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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