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“Reverse” nested lottery contests

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  • Fu, Qiang
  • Lu, Jingfeng
  • Wang, Zhewei

Abstract

This paper proposes a multi-prize “reverse” nested lottery contest model, which can be viewed as the “mirror image” of the conventional nested lottery contest of Clark and Riis (1996a). The reverse-lottery contest model determines winners by selecting losers based on contestants’ one-shot effort through a hypothetical sequence of lotteries. We provide a microfoundation for the reverse-lottery contest from a perspective of (simultaneous) noisy performance ranking and establish that the model is underpinned by a unique performance evaluation rule. We further demonstrate that the noisy-ranking model can be interpreted intuitively as a “worst-shot” contest, in which contestants’ performances are evaluated based on their most severe mistakes. The reverse-lottery contest model thus depicts a great variety of widely observed competitive activities of this nature. A handy closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium of the reverse-lottery contest is obtained. We show that the winner-take-all principle continues to hold in reverse-lottery contests. Moreover, we find that a reverse-lottery contest elicits more effort than a conventional lottery contest whenever the prizes available to contestants are relatively scarce.

Suggested Citation

  • Fu, Qiang & Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei, 2014. "“Reverse” nested lottery contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 128-140.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:50:y:2014:i:c:p:128-140
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.08.007
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    1. Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela, 2008. "The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 615-631, Springer.
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    16. McFadden, Daniel, 1974. "The measurement of urban travel demand," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 303-328, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Aner Sela, 2020. "Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(3), pages 749-771, September.
    2. Alberto Vesperoni, 2016. "A contest success function for rankings," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 905-937, December.
    3. repec:shn:wpaper:2014-02 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zhewei, 2015. "Axiomatizing multi-prize nested lottery contests: A complete and strict ranking perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 127-141.
    5. Jingfeng Lu & Zhewei Wang, 2016. "Axiomatization of reverse nested lottery contests," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(4), pages 939-957, December.
    6. Fu, Qiang & Wang, Xiruo & Wu, Zenan, 2021. "Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 513-535.
    7. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Anwesha Mukherjee & Theodore L. Turocy, 2021. "And the first runner-up is...: Sequential versus simultaneous winner revelation in multi-winner discriminated Tullock contests," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 21-01, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    8. Lu, Jingfeng & Shen, Bo & Wang, Zhewei, 2017. "Optimal contest design under reverse-lottery technology," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 25-35.
    9. Alberto Vesperoni & Anıl Yıldızparlak, 2019. "Inequality and conflict outbreak," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 135-173, June.
    10. Aner Sela & Amit Yeshayahu, 2022. "Contests with identity-dependent externalities," Working Papers 2203, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contest elimination function; Imperfectly discriminatory contests; Least-favorable performance ranking; Multi-prize contest;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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