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The uniform rule with several commodities: A generalization of Sprumont's characterization

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  • Adachi, Tsuyoshi

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of allocating multiple divisible commodities among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. We show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and same-sidedness: the third axiom is a weak efficiency condition that is equivalent to Pareto efficiency in the single-commodity case. Therefore, this result generalizes the characterization of the uniform rule by Sprumont (1991. Econometrica 59 (2), 509-519) in the single-commodity case: it is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and Pareto efficiency.

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  • Adachi, Tsuyoshi, 2010. "The uniform rule with several commodities: A generalization of Sprumont's characterization," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 952-964, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:6:p:952-964
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    Cited by:

    1. Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Package Assignment," Working Papers 2013:43, Lund University, Department of Economics.
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    3. Özgür Kıbrıs & İpek Tapkı, 2014. "A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 18(3), pages 163-189, September.
    4. Bochet, Olivier & Tumennasan, Norovsambuu, 2020. "Dominance of truthtelling and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    5. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2021. "Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(2), pages 376-401, April.
    6. Shuhei Morimoto & Shigehiro Serizawa & Stephen Ching, 2013. "A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(3), pages 871-911, March.
    7. William Thomson, 2018. "On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(1), pages 67-99, June.
    8. Erlanson, Albin & Flores-Szwagrzak, Karol, 2015. "Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 137-162.

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