On sabotage in collective tournaments
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Christian Deutscher & Bernd Frick & Oliver Gürtler & Joachim Prinz, 2013. "Sabotage in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Contestants: Empirical Evidence from the Soccer Pitch," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(4), pages 1138-1157, October.
- Junichiro Ishida, 2013. "Multilayered Tournaments," ISER Discussion Paper 0879, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Peter-J. Jost, 2021. "“The ball is round, the game lasts 90 minutes, everything else is pure theoryâ€," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 22(1), pages 27-74, January.
- Eberlein, Marion & Walkowitz, Gari, 2008. "Positive and Negative Team Identity in a Promotion Game," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 13/2008, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- Subhasish Chowdhury & Oliver Gürtler, 2015.
"Sabotage in contests: a survey,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 135-155, July.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Oliver Gurtler, 2013. "Sabotage in Contests: A Survey," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 051, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Kölle, Felix, 2020.
"Governance and Group Conflict,"
MPRA Paper
98859, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Felix Koelle, 2020. "Governance and Group Conflict," Discussion Papers 2020-04, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Kölle, Felix, 2020. "Governance and Group Conflict," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224515, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Nieken, Petra & Stegh, Michael, 2010. "Incentive Effects in Asymmetric Tournaments Empirical Evidence from the German Hockey League," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 305, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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