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Does threat of mutually assured destruction produce quasi-cooperation in the mackerel fishery?

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  • Hannesson, Rögnvaldur

Abstract

This paper uses a quarterly, game-theoretic model of the Northeast Atlantic mackerel to study the fishing strategies of five players: the EU, Norway, the Faeroe Islands, Iceland, and the international fishery on the high seas. Data on the spatial distribution of fish catches (1977–2011) are used to model changes in the distribution of the mackerel stock. The Nash equilibrium solutions predict a severe decimation of the stock through overfishing, either by parties (Iceland, the Faeroe Islands) that refuse to cooperate or by a general absence of cooperation. There is a wide discrepancy between this prediction and reality, as the stock seems, at most, only moderately overexploited, despite non-cooperation by Iceland and the Faeroe Islands. It is conjectured that these parties, and others, may engage in a degree of quasi-cooperation that falls somewhat short of full cooperation but avoids the extreme destruction of the Nash equilibrium. This tacit cooperation can be seen as being maintained by a mutually assured destruction of the fisheries of all parties in case they go to the logical extremes of non-cooperation.

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  • Hannesson, Rögnvaldur, 2014. "Does threat of mutually assured destruction produce quasi-cooperation in the mackerel fishery?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 342-350.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:44:y:2014:i:c:p:342-350
    DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2013.09.026
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Straub, Jeremy, 2019. "Mutual assured destruction in information, influence and cyber warfare: Comparing, contrasting and combining relevant scenarios," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    3. Costello, Christopher & Molina, Renato, 2021. "Transboundary marine protected areas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    4. Rosch-Grace, Dominic & Straub, Jeremy, 2022. "Analysis of the likelihood of quantum computing proliferation," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).

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