Does informal tenure result in land inequality? A critique of tenure formalisation reforms in Cambodia

Tenure reform is a contentious area of agrarian policy debate. Policies promoted by international financial institutions view locally-based informal tenure as a barrier to the efficient market allocation of land. In response, land titling projects install global-standard tenure frameworks that support functioning rural land markets. The opposing view holds that locally-based informal tenure secures the land holdings of the most vulnerable and should be strengthened, not replaced. Drawing on evidence from smallholder land markets in Cambodia, this paper brings new perspectives to these debates. It finds informal tenure is associated with a distribution of land that is both inequitable and inefficient from an output perspective. It is argued that this distribution is not caused by deficient land markets, but other underlying factors that render smaller farms less economically viable despite being more productive than larger farms. The study explores the implications of these findings for orthodox representations of informal tenure and land markets, the prevalent land titling programmatic approach and discussions about land distribution efficiency more generally.