Playing with Supertankers: Centralization in Land Use Planning in Israel — A National Experiment Underway

Compared with decentralization of planning powers, centralization has not been popular in planning policy in the past few decades. Centralization has become associated with dysfunctional governance, obsolete planning, and unconstitutional and unaccountable policies. Nevertheless there are cases in which countries have experimented with centralization in order to solve crises and improve the supply of goods and services. This paper focuses on centralization reforms in Israel that were designed to deal with a chronic shortage in housing. Through interviews with experts, and analysis of laws, and related documents, we address several questions. First, what kinds of steps have been taken recently to centralize planning in the Israeli planning system? Second, what were the motivations behind these steps? And last, in what way have these steps reformed planning in Israel, and what were their consequences? We investigate these issues by looking at a newly established national planning committee:the National Committee for Preferred Housing Plansalso known as “the Supertanker”. The paper examines the aims and objectives of the legislature in forming theSupertanker, and whether these objectives were fulfilled. The findings show that the new policy arrangement has revamped the planning system, reduced the roles of regional planners, and created a fast track that circumvents older, and slower, planning processes, in an attempt to increase the production of housing units, including affordable apartments. The findings also suggest that despite public scrutiny, the Supertanker’s performance cannot be judged solely on the grounds of it being undemocratic and environmentally destructive, as there is conflicting evidence about its ability to speed-up plan approval processes, and enlarge the future housing stock.