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The theory and practice of decoupling utility revenues from sales

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  • Eto, Joseph
  • Stoft, Steven
  • Belden, Timothy

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  • Eto, Joseph & Stoft, Steven & Belden, Timothy, 1997. "The theory and practice of decoupling utility revenues from sales," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 43-55, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:6:y:1997:i:1:p:43-55
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hirst, Eric & Goldman, Charles & Hopkins, Mary Ellen, 1991. "Integrated resource planning: Electric and gas utilities in the USA," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 172-186, January.
    2. Moskovitz, David & Swofford, Gary, 1991. "Decoupling sales and profits: An incentive approach that works," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 4(6), pages 46-53, July.
    3. Hirst, Eric & Blank, Eric, 1994. "Solutions to regulatory disincentives for utility DSM programmes," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 105-112, April.
    4. Eto, Joseph & Hirst, Eric, 1996. "What kind of future for energy efficiency?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 9(5), pages 76-82, June.
    5. Winpenny, J. T., 1992. "Powerless and thirsty? : The outlook for energy and water in developing countries," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 290-295, October.
    6. Kenneth E. Train, 1991. "Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200848, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Satchwell, Andrew & Cappers, Peter & Goldman, Charles, 2011. "Carrots and sticks: A comprehensive business model for the successful achievement of energy efficiency resource standards," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 218-225.
    2. Arlan Brucal & Nori Tarui, 2018. "Revenue Decoupling for Electric Utilities: Impacts on Prices and Welfare," Working Papers 201814, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    3. Eto, J. & Stoft, S. & Kito, S., 1998. "DSM shareholder incentives: recent designs and economic theory," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-62, March.
    4. von Loessl, Victor & Wetzel, Heike, 2022. "Revenue decoupling, energy demand, and energy efficiency: Empirical evidence from the U.S. electricity sector," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    5. Brucal, Arlan & Tarui, Nori, 2021. "The effects of utility revenue decoupling on electricity prices," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    6. Dutt, Dwarkeshwar & Ranjan, Abhishek, 2022. "Towards a just energy transition in Delhi: Addressing the bias in the rooftop solar market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    7. Arlan Brucal & Nori Tarui, 2018. "Revenue Decoupling for Electric Utilities: Impacts on Prices and Welfare," Working Papers 201814, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    8. Blumstein, Carl, 2010. "Program evaluation and incentives for administrators of energy-efficiency programs: Can evaluation solve the principal/agent problem?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(10), pages 6232-6239, October.
    9. Flavio Menezes & Joisa Dutra & Xuemei Zheng, 2013. "Energy Efficiency and Price Regulation," Discussion Papers Series 495, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    10. Michelfelder, Richard A. & Ahern, Pauline & D'Ascendis, Dylan, 2019. "Decoupling impact and public utility conservation investment," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 311-319.
    11. Victor von Loessl & Heike Wetzel, 2019. "Revenue decoupling and energy consumption: Empirical evidence from the U.S. electric utilities sector," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201918, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    12. Datta, Souvik, 2019. "Decoupling and demand-side management: Evidence from the US electric industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 175-184.
    13. Satchwell, Andrew & Mills, Andrew & Barbose, Galen, 2015. "Regulatory and ratemaking approaches to mitigate financial impacts of net-metered PV on utilities and ratepayers," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 115-125.
    14. Lo Prete, Chiara & Hobbs, Benjamin F., 2016. "A cooperative game theoretic analysis of incentives for microgrids in regulated electricity markets," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 524-541.
    15. Nori Tarui, 2017. "Electric utility regulation under enhanced renewable energy integration and distributed generation," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 19(3), pages 503-518, July.
    16. Gerlach, Heiko & Zheng, Xuemei, 2018. "Preferences for green electricity, investment and regulatory incentives," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 430-441.
    17. Joisa Dutra & Flavio M. Menezes & Xuemei Zheng, 2016. "Price Regulation and the Incentives to Pursue Energy Efficiency by Minimizing Network Losses," The Energy Journal, , vol. 37(4), pages 45-62, October.

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