IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juipol/v7y1998i1p47-62.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

DSM shareholder incentives: recent designs and economic theory

Author

Listed:
  • Eto, J.
  • Stoft, S.
  • Kito, S.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Eto, J. & Stoft, S. & Kito, S., 1998. "DSM shareholder incentives: recent designs and economic theory," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 47-62, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:7:y:1998:i:1:p:47-62
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957-1787(98)00035-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eto, Joseph & Stoft, Steven & Belden, Timothy, 1997. "The theory and practice of decoupling utility revenues from sales," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 43-55, March.
    2. Benjamin F. Hobbs, 1991. "The "Most Value" Test: Economic Evaluation of Electricity Demand-Side Management Considering Customer Value," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 2), pages 67-92.
    3. Moskovitz, David & Harrington, Cheryl & Austin, Tom, 1992. "Weighing decoupling vs. lost revenues: Regulatory considerations," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 5(9), pages 58-63, November.
    4. Steven Braithwait & Douglas Caves, 1994. "Three Biases in Cost-Efficiency Tests of Utility Energy Efficiency Programs," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 95-120.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    6. Eto, J. & Goldman, C. & Kito, M. S., 1996. "Ratepayer-funded energy efficiency programs in a restructured electricity industry," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 9(7), pages 71-81.
    7. Kenneth E. Train, 1991. "Optimal Regulation: The Economic Theory of Natural Monopoly," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200848, April.
    8. Eto, Joseph & Hirst, Eric, 1996. "What kind of future for energy efficiency?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 9(5), pages 76-82, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Madina, Carlos & Zamora, Inmaculada & Zabala, Eduardo, 2016. "Methodology for assessing electric vehicle charging infrastructure business models," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 284-293.
    2. Laura Abrardi & Carlo Cambini, 2014. "Tariff Regulation with Energy Efficiency Goals," IEFE Working Papers 65, IEFE, Center for Research on Energy and Environmental Economics and Policy, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    3. Abrardi, Laura & Cambini, Carlo, 2015. "Tariff regulation with energy efficiency goals," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 122-131.
    4. Datta, Souvik, 2019. "Decoupling and demand-side management: Evidence from the US electric industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 175-184.
    5. Leon Chu & David Sappington, 2012. "Designing optimal gain sharing plans to promote energy conservation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 115-134, October.
    6. Leon Chu & David Sappington, 2013. "Motivating energy suppliers to promote energy conservation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 229-247, June.
    7. Spalding-Fecher, Randall & Clark, Alix & Davis, Mark & Simmonds, Gillian, 2002. "The economics of energy efficiency for the poor—a South African case study," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 27(12), pages 1099-1117.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Klein, Michael, 1996. "Competition in network industries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1591, The World Bank.
    2. Brucal, Arlan & Tarui, Nori, 2021. "The effects of utility revenue decoupling on electricity prices," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    3. Barbara Praetorius, 1996. "Nachfrageseitiges Marktversagen auf dem Energiemarkt: Empirische Evidenz, theoretische Aspekte, politische Folgerungen," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 65(2), pages 143-155.
    4. Arlan Brucal & Nori Tarui, 2018. "Revenue Decoupling for Electric Utilities: Impacts on Prices and Welfare," Working Papers 201814, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    5. Satchwell, Andrew & Mills, Andrew & Barbose, Galen, 2015. "Regulatory and ratemaking approaches to mitigate financial impacts of net-metered PV on utilities and ratepayers," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 115-125.
    6. Meya, Johannes, 2013. "Dynamics of Yardstick Regulation: Historical Cost Data and the Ratchet E ffect," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79796, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Gerlach, Heiko & Zheng, Xuemei, 2018. "Preferences for green electricity, investment and regulatory incentives," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 430-441.
    8. Joisa Dutra, Flavio M. Menezes, and Xuemei Zheng, 2016. "Price Regulation and the Incentives to Pursue Energy Efficiency by Minimizing Network Losses," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4).
    9. Franz Wirl & Wolfgang Orasch, 1998. "Analysis of United States' Utility Conservation Programs," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(4), pages 467-486, August.
    10. Chris Shugart, 1998. "Regulation-by-Contract and Municipal Services: The Problem of Contractual Incompleteness," Development Discussion Papers 1998-09, JDI Executive Programs.
    11. Berry, S. Keith, 2002. "Generation search costs and Ramsey pricing in a partially deregulated electric utility industry," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 331-343.
    12. Arlan Brucal & Nori Tarui, 2018. "Revenue Decoupling for Electric Utilities: Impacts on Prices and Welfare," Working Papers 201814, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    13. Eto, Joseph & Stoft, Steven & Belden, Timothy, 1997. "The theory and practice of decoupling utility revenues from sales," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 43-55, March.
    14. Haucap, Justus & Lange, Mirjam R. J. & Wey, Christian, 2012. "Nemo Omnibus Placet: Exzessive Regulierung und staatliche Willkür," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 27, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    15. Rodrigo M. S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2013. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 94-121, February.
    16. MARINI, Marco, 1996. "Property Rights and Market : Employee Privatization as a Cooperative Bargaining Process," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1996023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    17. Henrekson, Magnus & Johansson, Dan, 2010. "Firm Growth, Institutions and Structural Transformation," Ratio Working Papers 150, The Ratio Institute.
    18. Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault, 2011. "Price Discrimination," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 22, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    19. Yuzhou Jiang & Ramteen Sioshansi, 2023. "What Duality Theory Tells Us About Giving Market Operators the Authority to Dispatch Energy Storage," The Energy Journal, , vol. 44(3), pages 89-110, May.
    20. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:7:y:1998:i:1:p:47-62. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/utilities-policy .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.