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British utility regulation: Consolidation, existential angst, or fiasco?

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  • Lodge, Martin
  • Stern, Jon

Abstract

More than thirty years since the ‘Littlechild Report’ put forward an agenda for incentive-based and competition-driven regulation, the time has come to reconsider its legacy. This article places the debates surrounding utility regulation in context. First, it suggests that at least three dominant interpretations exist regarding the legacy of the Littlechild Report. Second, this article explores the original theoretical arguments that underpinned the proposals underpinning the Report. Third, this article considers the contemporary challenges for utility regulation in the UK and elsewhere. Despite considerable concern about the state of utilities, and of utility regulation, the legacy of market-oriented regulation has been consolidated, especially in telecommunications.

Suggested Citation

  • Lodge, Martin & Stern, Jon, 2014. "British utility regulation: Consolidation, existential angst, or fiasco?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 146-151.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:31:y:2014:i:c:p:146-151
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2014.08.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Littlechild, Stephen, 2014. "RPI-X, competition as a rivalrous discovery process, and customer engagement – Paper presented at the Conference The British Utility Regulation Model: Beyond Competition and Incentive Regulation?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 152-161.
    2. Lodge, Martin, 2002. "The Wrong Type of Regulation? Regulatory Failure and the Railways in Britain and Germany," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 271-297, September.
    3. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    4. Gassner, Katharina & Pushak, Nataliya, 2014. "30 years of British utility regulation: Developing country experience and outlook," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 44-51.
    5. Price, Richard & Ross, Cathryn, 2014. "A better deal for consumers and an attractive environment for investors: The regulators' perspective on the development and use of regulatory and competition powers," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 178-183.
    6. Stern, Jon, 2014. "The British utility regulation model: Its recent history and future prospects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 162-172.
    7. Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2014. "Utility regulation in Africa: How relevant is the British model?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 203-205.
    8. J.A. Beecher, 2012. "NARUC as Network: A Perspective on the U.S. Regulatory Policy Community," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 13(4), pages 362-389, December.
    9. Bolt, Chris, 2014. "UK experience of utility regulation since 2003 and outlook," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 173-177.
    10. Dieter Helm, 2013. "British infrastructure policy and the gradual return of the state," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 29(2), pages 287-306, SUMMER.
    11. Peltzman, Sam, 1976. "Toward a More General Theory of Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(2), pages 211-240, August.
    12. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01109527 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Jensen, Olivia & Wu, Xun, 2017. "The hybrid model for economic regulation of water utilities: Mission impossible?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 122-131.
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    3. Heims, Eva M. & Lodge, Martin, 2018. "Customer engagement in UK water regulation: towards a collaborative regulatory state?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87258, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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