An Easy Proof That a Square Lattice Is an Equilibrium for Spatial Competition in the Plane
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"The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition,"
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- Huck, Steffen & Knoblauch, Vicki & Muller, Wieland, 2003.
"On the profitability of collusion in location games,"
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- Huck, Steffen & Knoblauch, Vicki & Müller, Wieland, 2000. "On the profitability of collusion in location games," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,23, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
- Huck, Steffen & Knoblauch, Vicki & Müller, Wieland, 2002. "On the profitability of collusion in location games [Zur Profitabilität von Kollusion in Standortspielen]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 02-22, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
- Huck, S. & Knoblauch, V. & Müller, W., 2003. "On the profitability of collusion in location games," Other publications TiSEM acfc82a2-59ee-401b-9e40-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Daniel Strobach, 2006. "Competition between airports with an application to the state of Baden-Württemberg," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 272/2006, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.
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