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Bailouts: The lesser of two evils?

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  • Calò, Silvia

Abstract

This paper investigates the relation between bailouts and regulation. Regulation, by limiting the room for government intervention in the market, can affect the likelihood and size of a bailout. While a higher level of regulation is associated with a lower likelihood of a direct acquisition, such countries resort to a higher use of State aid. The findings suggest the more transparent nature of direct acquisitions, makes them the lesser of two evils. In this light, policymakers should monitor State Aid and bailouts together, with the aim of making the former more transparent.

Suggested Citation

  • Calò, Silvia, 2019. "Bailouts: The lesser of two evils?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 84-98.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:41:y:2019:i:1:p:84-98
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2018.06.007
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bailouts; Regulation; State aid;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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