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Tradable tagged permit system for global pollution control

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  • Ahn, Byong-Hun
  • Kim, Yong-Gun

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  • Ahn, Byong-Hun & Kim, Yong-Gun, 2001. "Tradable tagged permit system for global pollution control," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 569-594, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:23:y:2001:i:5:p:569-594
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    3. Dutta Prajit K. & Sundaram Rangarajan K., 1993. "How Different Can Strategic Models Be?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 42-61, June.
    4. Nordhaus, William D., 1993. "Rolling the 'DICE': an optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 27-50, March.
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