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Playing Stackelberg Security Games in perfect formulations

Author

Listed:
  • Bustamante-Faúndez, Pamela
  • Bucarey L., Víctor
  • Labbé, Martine
  • Marianov, Vladimir
  • Ordoñez, Fernando

Abstract

Protecting critical infrastructure from intentional damage requires foreseeing the strategies of possible attackers. We formulate this problem as a Stackelberg Security Game. A defender must decide which specific targets to protect with limited resources, thus maximizing their expected utility (e.g., minimizing damage value) and considering that a second player (or players), called an attacker, responds in the best possible way.

Suggested Citation

  • Bustamante-Faúndez, Pamela & Bucarey L., Víctor & Labbé, Martine & Marianov, Vladimir & Ordoñez, Fernando, 2024. "Playing Stackelberg Security Games in perfect formulations," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jomega:v:126:y:2024:i:c:s0305048324000355
    DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2024.103068
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chakravarty, Amiya K., 2011. "A contingent plan for disaster response," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 3-15, November.
    2. Casorrán, Carlos & Fortz, Bernard & Labbé, Martine & Ordóñez, Fernando, 2019. "A study of general and security Stackelberg game formulations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 278(3), pages 855-868.
    3. Nicola Basilico & Stefano Coniglio & Nicola Gatti & Alberto Marchesi, 2020. "Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games," EURO Journal on Computational Optimization, Springer;EURO - The Association of European Operational Research Societies, vol. 8(1), pages 3-31, March.
    4. Eric Budish & Yeon-Koo Che & Fuhito Kojima & Paul Milgrom, 2013. "Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 585-623, April.
    5. Yusta, Jose M. & Correa, Gabriel J. & Lacal-Arántegui, Roberto, 2011. "Methodologies and applications for critical infrastructure protection: State-of-the-art," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(10), pages 6100-6119, October.
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