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Conflict resolution through voluntary provision of property protection

Author

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  • Boyce, John R.
  • Bruner, David M.

Abstract

This paper reports the results of an experimental test of Nash equilibrium predictions of voluntary provision of property protection in a contest with an endogenously determined prize. The experiment investigates whether the mechanism of allowing irreversible contributions to security prior to choices over production and conflict induces positive provision of property protection due to the strategic effect on conflict, resulting in greater production. We find robust evidence that contributions to security increase with sequential decision-making, resulting in less conflict. However, there is no evidence that production increased. There is evidence larger groups resulted in less property protection and greater conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Boyce, John R. & Bruner, David M., 2017. "Conflict resolution through voluntary provision of property protection," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 199-215.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:63:y:2017:i:c:p:199-215
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.02.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mutual monitoring; Conflict; Rent-seeking; Contests; Experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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