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Competition-induced punishment of winners and losers: Who is the target?

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  • Jauernig, Johanna
  • Uhl, Matthias
  • Luetge, Christoph

Abstract

We elicit punishment after competition. Our experiment creates a setting in which winners and losers are assigned in a pairwise speed-based calculation task. As in Abbink and Sadrieh’s (2009) joy-of-destruction game punishment is executed by burning parts of another participant’s endowment. We manipulate the target of punishment to investigate whether it is driven by discrimination of the direct opponent, the outgroup or by joy of destruction. Furthermore, we analyze the role that the clarity of victory or defeat plays for punishment after competition. Our findings suggest that losers face punishment from particularly dominant winners and—to a lesser degree—from particularly frustrated losers. Winners face undifferentiated punishment from all sides. Our results have implications for the prevention of destructive behavior within organizations which use competitions in order to induce effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Jauernig, Johanna & Uhl, Matthias & Luetge, Christoph, 2016. "Competition-induced punishment of winners and losers: Who is the target?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 13-25.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:57:y:2016:i:c:p:13-25
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2016.08.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Grosch, Kerstin & Ibanez, Marcela & Viceisza, Angelino, 2017. "Competition and prosociality: A field experiment in Ghana," GlobalFood Discussion Papers 266141, Georg-August-Universitaet Goettingen, GlobalFood, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development.
    3. Johanna Jauernig & Matthias Uhl & Christoph Luetge, 2017. "Voluntary agreements between competitors: trick or truth?," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 87(9), pages 1173-1191, December.
    4. von Grundherr, Michael & Jauernig, Johanna & Uhl, Matthias, 2021. "To condemn is not to punish: An experiment on hypocrisy," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 12(2), pages 1-13.
    5. Jauernig, Johanna & Uhl, Matthias, 2019. "Spite and preemptive retaliation after tournaments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 328-336.
    6. Grosch, Kerstin & Ibañez, Marcela & Viceisza, Angelino, 2022. "Competition and prosociality: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Ghana," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    7. Vicente, Pedro C. & Vilela, Inês, 2022. "Preventing Islamic radicalization: Experimental evidence on anti-social behavior," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 474-485.
    8. Pedro C. Vicente & Ines Vilela, 2020. "Preventing violent Islamic radicalization: experimental evidence on anti-social behavior," NOVAFRICA Working Paper Series wp2008, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics, NOVAFRICA.
    9. Michael von Grundherr & Johanna Jauernig & Matthias Uhl, 2021. "To Condemn Is Not to Punish: An Experiment on Hypocrisy," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(2), pages 1-13, April.
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    11. Sanjaya, Muhammad Ryan, 2023. "Antisocial behavior in experiments: What have we learned from the past two decades?," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 104-115.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition; Social comparison; Winners; Losers; Joy of destruction; Money burning;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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