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Third-party sanctioning and compensation behavior: Findings from the ultimatum game

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  • Chavez, Alex K.
  • Bicchieri, Cristina

Abstract

We measured the beliefs and behavior of third parties who were given the opportunity to add to or deduct from the payoffs of individuals who engaged in an economic bargaining game under different social contexts. Third parties rewarded bargaining outcomes that were equal and compensated victims of unfair bargaining outcomes rather than punishing perpetrators, but were willing to punish when compensation was not an available option. Beliefs of whether unequal bargaining outcomes were fair differed based on the normative context, but actual punishment, compensation, and rewarding behavior did not. This paper makes a contribution to the literature on informal mechanisms of social norm enforcement by comparing negative sanctions, positive sanctions, and compensation behavior by third parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Chavez, Alex K. & Bicchieri, Cristina, 2013. "Third-party sanctioning and compensation behavior: Findings from the ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 268-277.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:39:y:2013:i:c:p:268-277
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Tan, Fangfang & Xiao, Erte, 2018. "Third-party punishment: Retribution or deterrence?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 34-46.
    2. Kriss, Peter H. & Weber, Roberto A. & Xiao, Erte, 2016. "Turning a blind eye, but not the other cheek: On the robustness of costly punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 159-177.
    3. Cristina Bicchieri & Ryan Muldoon & Alessandro Sontuoso, 2018. "Social Norms," PPE Working Papers 0015, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    4. Christine Clavien & Danielle P Mersch & Michel Chapuisat, 2016. "No Evidence for Moral Reward and Punishment in an Anonymous Context," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 11(3), pages 1-9, March.
    5. Yin, Xile & Li, Jianbiao & Li, Dahui & Chen, Siyu, 2023. "When emotional responses conflict with self-interested impulses: A transcranial direct current stimulation study of cognitive control in cooperative norm compliance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    6. Janne Doorn & Marcel Zeelenberg & Seger M. Breugelmans, 2018. "An exploration of third parties’ preference for compensation over punishment: six experimental demonstrations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 333-351, October.
    7. Yuzhen Li & Jun Luo & He Niu & Hang Ye, 2023. "When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 423-465, April.
    8. Cristina Bicchieri & Alessandro Sontuoso, 2017. "Game-Theoretic Accounts of Social Norms. The Role of Normative Expectations," PPE Working Papers 0011, Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    9. Bicchieri, Cristina & Maras, Marta, 2022. "Intentionality matters for third-party punishment but not compensation in trust games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 205-220.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social norms; compensation; rewarding; third-party punishment; Fairness; Equality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C38 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Classification Methdos; Cluster Analysis; Principal Components; Factor Analysis
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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