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Deception as competence: The effect of occupational stereotypes on the perception and proliferation of deception

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  • Gunia, Brian C.
  • Levine, Emma E.

Abstract

Deception is common but widely condemned. The current research examines why. Integrating theories of selling, stereotypes, and negotiation—and challenging much research and rhetoric on deception—we document that perceivers do not always disapprove of deceivers. Instead, they conclude that deceivers will be competent in certain occupations: those in which a selling orientation (SO) is stereotypically seen as integral to the job. We first introduce SO as an occupational stereotype and distinguish between occupations stereotyped as high vs. low in SO (HISO vs. LISO). We then demonstrate (across six studies; two preregistered; total N = 1584) that deception is perceived to signal a person’s ability to engage in SO, and thus their competence in HISO occupations. Finally, we show that this perception may lead to the hiring of deceptive individuals. These results identify occupations as a moderator of deception-related reactions, helping to explain persistent deception and highlight possible interventions.

Suggested Citation

  • Gunia, Brian C. & Levine, Emma E., 2019. "Deception as competence: The effect of occupational stereotypes on the perception and proliferation of deception," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 122-137.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jobhdp:v:152:y:2019:i:c:p:122-137
    DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.02.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Boles, Terry L. & Croson, Rachel T. A. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 2000. "Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 235-259, November.
    2. Alain Cohn & Ernst Fehr & Michel André Maréchal, 2014. "Business culture and dishonesty in the banking industry," Nature, Nature, vol. 516(7529), pages 86-89, December.
    3. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
    4. Croson, Rachel & Boles, Terry & Murnighan, J. Keith, 2003. "Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 143-159, June.
    5. Schweitzer, Maurice E. & Hershey, John C. & Bradlow, Eric T., 2006. "Promises and lies: Restoring violated trust," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 1-19, September.
    6. Levine, Emma E. & Schweitzer, Maurice E., 2015. "Prosocial lies: When deception breeds trust," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 88-106.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stiegert, Peer & Täuber, Susanne & Leliveld, Marijke C. & Oehmichen, Jana, 2021. "The stereotype rub-off effect – Organizational stereotypes modulate behavioural expectations, expectancy violation and punishment after transgressions," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 127-138.
    2. Vranka, Marek & Hudík, Marek & Frollová, Nikola & Bahník, Štěpán & Sýkorová, Markéta & Houdek, Petr, 2021. "Honesty of online workers: A field experiment shows no evidence of self-selection of cheaters to a cheating-enabling work environment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    3. Kang, Polly & Schweitzer, Maurice E., 2022. "Emotional Deception in Negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    4. Levine, Emma E. & Wald, Kristina A., 2020. "Fibbing about your feelings: How feigning happiness in the face of personal hardship affects trust," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 135-154.
    5. Sherwood, Charles, 2022. "A lie is a lie: the ethics of lying in business negotiations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 113331, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

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