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Busy physicians

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  • Grytten, Jostein
  • Sørensen, Rune

Abstract

Numerous researchers have explored whether general practitioners compensate for a shortage of patients by providing more items of treatment. Empirical testing of this hypothesis often lacks a valid measure of the relevant patient population. In the Norwegian case, researchers have exploited the fact that most patients are registered on a patient list of one general practitioner. However, a significant number of patients move between physicians. We show that physicians with a deficit of patients on the list attract more external patients than those with a surplus of patients on the list. In contrast with previous research, we find no evidence of revenue compensation when consultations with external patients are taken into account.

Suggested Citation

  • Grytten, Jostein & Sørensen, Rune, 2008. "Busy physicians," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 510-518, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:27:y:2008:i:2:p:510-518
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hausman, Jerry, 2015. "Specification tests in econometrics," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 38(2), pages 112-134.
    2. Kathryn M. Langwell, 1982. "Factors Affecting the Incomes of Men and Women Physicians: Further Explorations," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 17(2), pages 261-275.
    3. Grytten, Jostein & Sorensen, Rune, 2007. "Primary physician services--List size and primary physicians' service production," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 721-741, July.
    4. Iversen, Tor & Luras, Hilde, 2000. "Economic motives and professional norms: the case of general medical practice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 447-470, December.
    5. Iversen, Tor, 2004. "The effects of a patient shortage on general practitioners' future income and list of patients," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 673-694, July.
    6. Stano, Miron, 1985. "An analysis of the evidence on competition in the physician services markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 197-211, September.
    7. Dranove, David & Wehner, Paul, 1994. "Physician-induced demand for childbirths," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 61-73, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tor Iversen & Hilde Lurås, 2012. "Capitation and Incentives in Primary Care," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 26, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Kann, Inger Cathrine & Biørn, Erik & Lurås, Hilde, 2010. "Competition in general practice: Prescriptions to the elderly in a list patient system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 751-764, September.
    3. Grytten, Jostein & Carlsen, Fredrik & Skau, Irene, 2009. "Services production and patient satisfaction in primary care," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(3), pages 312-321, March.
    4. Iversen, Tor & Lurås, Hilde, 2011. "Patient switching in general practice," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 894-903.

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