State health insurance market reforms and access to insurance for high-risk employees
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Cited by:
- John F. Cogan & R. Glenn Hubbard & Daniel P. Kessler, 2008. "The Effect of Medicare Coverage for the Disabled on the Market for Private Insurance," NBER Working Papers 14309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kanika Kapur & José J. Escarce & M. Susan Marquis & Kosali I. Simon, 2008.
"Where Do the Sick Go? Health Insurance and Employment in Small and Large Firms,"
Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(3), pages 644-664, January.
- Kanika Kapur & José J. Escarce & M. Susan Marquis & Kosali I. Simon, 2005. "Where do the sick go? Health insurance and employment in small and large firms," Open Access publications 10197/259, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
- Kanika Kapur & José J. Escarce & M. Susan Marquis & Kosali I. Simon, 2006. "Where do the sick go? Health insurance and employment in small and large firms," Working Papers 200613, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
- Graddy-Reed, Alexandra & Lanahan, Lauren & Eyer, Jonathan, 2019. "Gender discrepancies in publication productivity of high-performing life science graduate students," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(9), pages 1-1.
- Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Jean M. Abraham & Kosali Simon & Roger Feldman, 2013.
"Going into the Affordable Care Act: Measuring the Size, Structure, and Performance of the Individual and Small Group Markets for Health Insurance,"
NBER Chapters, in: Measuring and Modeling Health Care Costs, pages 419-456,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pinar Karaca-Mandic & Jean M. Abraham & Kosali Simon & Roger Feldman, 2013. "Going into the Affordable Care Act: Measuring the Size, Structure and Performance of the Individual and Small Group Markets for Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 19719, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bradley Herring & Mark V. Pauly, 2006. "The Effect of State Community Rating Regulations on Premiums and Coverage in the Individual Health Insurance Market," NBER Working Papers 12504, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wichman, Casey J., 2014. "Perceived price in residential water demand: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 308-323.
- Jeffrey Clemens, 2015.
"Regulatory Redistribution in the Market for Health Insurance,"
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 109-134, April.
- Jeffrey Clemens, 2012. "Regulatory Redistribution in the Market for Health Insurance," Discussion Papers 11-011, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Jeffrey Clemens, 2014. "Regulatory Redistribution in the Market for Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 19904, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin & Shouying Liu & Fang Xia, 2020.
"Property rights reform to support China’s rural ‐ urban integration: household‐level evidence from the Chengdu experiment,"
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 64(1), pages 30-54, January.
- Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing & Liu, Shouying & Xia, Fang, 2020. "Property rights reform to support China’s rural - urban integration: household-level evidence from the Chengdu experiment," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 64(01), January.
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