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Supply-side cost sharing when patients and doctors collude

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  • Vaithianathan, Rhema

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  • Vaithianathan, Rhema, 2003. "Supply-side cost sharing when patients and doctors collude," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 763-780, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:22:y:2003:i:5:p:763-780
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chalkley, Martin & Malcomson, James M., 1998. "Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-19, January.
    2. Blomqvist, Ake, 1991. "The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 411-432.
    3. Cutler, David M. & Zeckhauser, Richard J., 2000. "The anatomy of health insurance," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 563-643, Elsevier.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
    5. Paul H. Rubin & Joel L. Schrag, 1999. "Mitigating Agency Problems by Advertising, with Special Reference to Managed Health Care," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(1), pages 39-60, July.
    6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 309-342, March.
    7. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-942, July.
    8. Ma, Ching-to Albert & McGuire, Thomas G, 1997. "Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 685-704, September.
    9. Glazer, Jacob & Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 1993. "Should physicians be permitted to 'balance bill' patients?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 239-258, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yaping Wu & David Bardey & Yijuan Chen & Sanxi Li, 2021. "Health care insurance policies When the provider and patient may collude," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(3), pages 525-543, March.
    2. Bardey, David & Li, Sanxi & Wu, Yaping, 2015. "Health Care Insurance Payment Policy when the Physician and Patient May Collude," TSE Working Papers 15-572, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. Onwujekwe, Obinna & Dike, Nkem & Uzochukwu, Benjamin & Ezeoke, Ogochukwu, 2010. "Informal payments for healthcare: Differences in expenditures from consumers and providers perspectives for treatment of malaria in Nigeria," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 72-79, June.
    4. Tim Ensor & Robin Thompson, 2012. "Unofficial Payments in Low- and Middle-income Countries," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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